Hitachi Automotive Systems Americas Settles EEOC Disability Discrimination Suit
Hitachi Automotive Systems Americas, Inc., a global supplier of automotive parts located in Monroe, Ga., will pay $85,000 and provide other significant relief to settle a disability discrimination lawsuit filed by the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the federal agency announced. The EEOC charged that Hitachi unlawfully discriminated against an assembly operator when it refused to accommodate her disability and rescinded an offer of permanent employment.
According to the EEOC's lawsuit, Misti Huff King, an assembly operator at Hitachi's Monroe facility, had a medical condition that required her to take frequent restroom breaks. After receiving a positive evaluation and successfully completing her probationary period, Hitachi extended an offer of permanent employment to King. During the screening process, King requested a reasonable accommodation - that she be allowed to take additional restroom breaks beyond her lunch break and scheduled 15-minute break. Instead of granting King's request, Hitachi determined she was unable to perform the job and rescinded its permanent job offer.
Such conduct violates the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), which prohibits employers from making employment decisions based on an individual's disability. The EEOC filed suit (EEOC v. Hitachi Automotive Systems Americas, Inc., Civil Action No. 1:19-cv-03887-MLB-JKL) in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta Division.
Fifth Circuit: Obese Employee Not Disabled Under the ADA (US)
As discussed in our prior posts on obesity and disability law, there is continuing disagreement in the courts concerning whether obesity alone constitutes a disability, or whether obesity must result from a physical disease or condition in order to be a disability. On February 27, 2020, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit became the latest federal circuit court to consider whether obesity qualifies as a disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) in a case called Lumar v. Monsanto Company.
Under the ADA, “disability” is defined as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual.” Further, the ADA prohibits employers from discriminating against “qualified individuals” with disabilities, and defines such individuals as applicants or employees who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the job. In 2008, Congress amended the ADA to provide a broader interpretation of the definition of disability under the statute, and added a “regarded as” disabled component of disability discrimination. Thus, under the amendments, applicants and employees who cannot show they have an actual disability within the meaning of the ADA may nonetheless prevail if they can prove their employer regarded them as disabled.
In the years since the amendments, obese plaintiffs in multiple jurisdictions have used this more expansive interpretation of disability to argue that their employers have violated the ADA, as amended, by discriminating against them or creating a hostile work environment because of their obesity. Courts and relevant federal agencies have reached conflicting conclusions regarding the extent to which obesity is protected under the ADA. For example, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) has taken the position that obesity can constitute an impairment under the ADA in some, but not all, circumstances. Specifically, the EEOC’s interpretive guidance explains that the definition of the term “impairment” does not include physical characteristics, including weight, that are within “normal” range and are not the result of a physiological disorder. Applying a “natural reading” of the EEOC’s interpretive guidance, the Second, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have all held that obesity alone, without evidence of an underlying physiological condition, is not a physical impairment amounting to a disability under the ADA.
But other jurisdictions have come to the opposite conclusion. For example, the First Circuit held in Cook v. State of R.I. Dept. of Mental Health that morbid obesity can be a disability under the ADA even without an underlying physiological disorder and concluded that this issue is ultimately a question for a jury to decide. Further, as we recently reported here, the Ninth Circuit and the Washington Supreme Court have been grappling with this same issue under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (“WLAD”). After the Washington Supreme Court ruled that obesity is protected under the WLAD, the Ninth Circuit reversed a district court’s grant of summary judgment to the employer in the case, holding that the plaintiff’s claim of discrimination based on his obesity asserted a valid legal theory. Although the case did not specifically address the issue of obesity as a disability under the ADA, the Ninth Circuit’s revival of the obesity discrimination claims under state law could mean that the circuit would be willing to find a valid disability claim under federal law as well.
Until now, the Fifth Circuit had not directly ruled on the issue of obesity as a disability under the ADA. However, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana (which is a district within the Fifth Circuit) held in 2011 that severe obesity is a disability under the ADA and does not require proof of a physiological basis for it to quality. The Fifth Circuit, however, seems to be more discerning when it comes to obesity discrimination claims.
In Lumar, the plaintiff sued his employer under the ADA alleging that the employer discriminated against him and subjected him to a hostile work environment because of his morbid obesity. In order to prevail on his claims, the plaintiff was required to first show that he was disabled. Mr. Lumar contended that his obesity qualified as a disability and alternatively, he claimed that even if his obesity did not qualify as an actual disability, his claims could proceed because his employer regarded him as being disabled, in violation of the ADA. However, the court declined to consider the plaintiff’s regarded-as theory of recovery because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and did not assert this argument until his response to his employer’s motion for summary judgment.
Ultimately, the court rejected Mr. Lumar’s claims. Although the court did not join the other circuits in specifically holding that obese plaintiffs need to show that their obesity is the result of an underlying physiological disorder in order for it to qualify as an impairment under the ADA, the court did hold that the plaintiff failed to prove he was disabled. The court reasoned that, even assuming that the plaintiff’s obesity was a physical impairment, there was no evidence that his weight limited his life activities in any way, which was underscored by the plaintiff’s own emphatic testimony that it did not. Therefore, the court held that the plaintiff failed to show he was disabled for purposes of the ADA.
The Fifth Circuit’s decision further illustrates the division among courts regarding the extent to which obesity is protected under the ADA. Accordingly, employers should continue to be cautious when making employment decisions involving this issue and should consider consulting with counsel before making such decisions to ensure compliance in their particular jurisdiction. As always, we will continue to keep you apprised as more courts provide interpretations on this issue.
Illinois District Court Denies Certification of ADA Claims in Airplane Mechanic Case
It’s been awhile since we’ve addressed attempts at bringing class action disability claims (September 27, 2013 and March 6, 2014), but as we’ve noted in the past, they make poor candidates for class action treatment. Disability claims almost by definition involve more, and more highly individualized, inquiries and quickly run into trouble satisfying Rule 23’s requirements.
A case from the Northern District of Illinois well illustrates this point. In DeFreitas v. United Airlines, Case No. 19 C 3397 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 11, 2020), the plaintiff was an airline maintenance worker who claimed that he was suffering from a degenerative and painful cervical disc disease. He contended that he sought sedentary work as an accommodation, but despite multiple requests was never hired for any such positions within the airline. He ended up taking a position with a delivery service that better accommodated his condition.
The plaintiff then brought claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and sought to represent a class of current and former employees with similar claims. He proposed a rather broad class of current and former employees of the airline “who were employed at any time between January 25, 2014 through the date that class certification is granted and who had/has a physical or mental impairment and who were/are unable to continue working in his/her regular position and who applied for and were/are not selected for a vacant available position at [the airline] and who either (1) were identified by [the airline] as meeting minimum requirements for one of the available positions at [the airline]; and/or (2) secured an equivalent position at another company.” What’s wrong with this picture?
It turns out a lot. The defendant moved to strike the class claims because the class could not be ascertained. The district court had little trouble granting the motion, finding that each individual claim required consideration of factors such as whether the employee had a covered disability; whether the employee was perceived as disabled, whether the individual was actually qualified for an available job, whether the employee could do that job with or without a reasonable accommodation, the type of necessary accommodation, potential undue hardship, and whether the parties had engaged in the interactive process. As the court found, disability claims are rarely if ever certified as a class absent something akin to an illegal company-wide policy governing the placement of disabled employees. The court found further problems with the plaintiff’s proposed definition as it also contained terms that raised questions such as which positions were equivalent, how that could be determined on a class-wide basis, the essential functions of such positions etc. It therefore granted the motion to strike.
As noted above, disability discrimination claims don’t easily lend themselves to class action treatment. The plaintiff here also likely did himself no favors with such an unwieldly definition. Still, the DeFreitas case does serve as a warning that employers adopting across-the-board policies for handling requests for disability accommodations to be scrupulous in ensuring that those policies are lawful, at the risk of inviting a class.
The bottom line: Only in rare cases will a disability discrimination claim be subject to class action treatment.
A blind man failed the U.S. citizenship test after it wasn’t offered in Braille
Lucio Delgado was ready to become a citizen.
Born 100 percent blind, the 23-year-old legal permanent resident had been studying English for the past six years since coming to the United States from Mexico as a teenager, learning by listening in school and on the radio. He practiced all the civics questions that the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services officers would ask him for the citizenship test. He got a vision exam by an optometrist so he could prove he is legally blind, asking in his application that he be given the test in Braille.
But on May 21, Delgado failed the test — because there was one thing the blind man didn’t anticipate.
That day in May, Delgado had whizzed through the civics portion, which was oral. He spelled all the English words correctly when asked — words like Thanksgiving and president.
But then came the big problem: the reading portion of the exam.
The agent said they received his request for Braille, but, unfortunately, USCIS did not have Braille available.
They just had large print.
“I’m like, I don’t read large print,” he said. “I’m totally blind.”
Still, for the record, the officer gave him “three attempts to read a sentence” in English, as USCIS describes it in a letter Delgado provided. And, predictably, whether the print was large or small, Delgado couldn’t read what he couldn’t see.
The agent told him that he should come back for a second interview another time so the agents could waive the reading test — but only if he visited an ophthalmologist, rather than an optometrist, to certify he is 100 percent blind. Delgado, who does not have health insurance, said he could not afford to see the specialist.